“They’ve been living this way for centuries, are you really gonna change that in a year? All you can do is try.”
Summary
The above words, quoted from an unlucky soldier stationed in Iraq, seem to epitomize the entire endeavor. George Packer does a brilliant job setting the stage and providing an overview of the why’s and how’s of the Iraq war.
When it comes to events as significant as war, there are seldom singular reasons that confidently explain everything. WMDs were a reason the administration gave for invading; September 11th provided the provocation for public support. Beyond that, a menagerie of motivations and political realities were aligning to push America into war. According to Packer, George W. Bush was a principled man but not a leader with vision. As a result, when the catastrophe of 9/11 struck, he fell back on his gut instinct, which told him justice needed to be done, without adequately considering long-term consequences. Meanwhile, a parallel ideology known as neoconservatism, which had a particular vision of America’s role in the world, happened to be ascending. Thus, Bush’s gut feelings found theoretical support, providing the vision he lacked.
While the war is now almost universally seen as a mistake, Packer suggests it might not have necessarily had to end badly. Initially, there was some Iraqi appetite for American intervention. However, America soon discovered that removing a dictator does not automatically guarantee a liberal democracy will follow. Despite brief opportunities when the U.S. had goodwill from Iraqis, neither Bush’s sense of justice nor his administration’s grand theory of liberal democracy was prepared for the complex reality of Iraqi factions. Consequently, nearly all Iraqi goodwill towards America was squandered by leadership that promised the American public a swift ‘in-and-out’ mission, toppling Saddam and leaving a thriving democracy behind.
One of Packer’s most egregious examples of American failure was the absolute lack of planning for rebuilding Iraq after Saddam’s defeat. U.S. forces had no plans for maintaining order, instead consolidating into isolated green zones and leaving the country to descend into complete anarchy. Rumsfeld believed that anarchy was merely a stage on the path to liberal democracy, but he would have benefited from heeding the Arab proverb: “Better forty years of dictatorship than one day of anarchy.” This stance repeatedly proved naive, as it assumed Iraqis were culturally identical to Americans and merely needed a strongman removed to refashion their government.
Thoughts
Packer argues that American foreign policy has rested upon two primal scenes: World War II and Vietnam. This framework is among the best explanatory models I’ve encountered. Every subsequent conflict invites public attempts to categorize the war into one of these classifications. Hawks tend to see each war as an opportunity for America to assert power abroad, teaching ‘bad guys’ lessons reminiscent of World War II. Conversely, anti-war advocates view each conflict as a quagmire that endlessly produces suffering without benefits, evoking memories of Vietnam.
This binary approach presents two problems. First, America will never again fight Nazis or the Viet Cong; every conflict is uniquely complex. Secondly, categorizing wars as simply good or bad is misguided, as all wars inherently involve suffering. The more relevant question becomes: which wars are worthwhile? When is the status quo worse than war?
Part of this story follows an American father who lost his son to shrapnel from an explosive device. These are questions he will grapple with for the rest of his life.
Today, more than a decade after the last American combat troops left Iraq, consensus views the war as a clear mistake. Yet, the what-ifs linger. The book highlights the principled and heroic efforts of service members genuinely trying to improve Iraqi lives. Even amidst failure, there were brief glimmers of hope—the jubilation many Iraqis felt voting for the first time, or the relief of Kurds who were systematically oppressed by Saddam’s regime. How does one weigh these outcomes?
The Iraq War left an indelible mark on American politics, fueling populism. After all, if experts could fail so spectacularly, perhaps it was time to dethrone them. Internationally, America’s image was tarnished; the gamble failed to produce a new Middle Eastern ally and instead stoked resentment and distrust.
This book greatly shaped my understanding of America’s evolving political landscape. I highly recommend it.